

9 May 1977

NOTE FOR: DDCI

X1 Taylor and [] have been responsive to the DCI's request, and given the premises of the talking paper before us last week, make a strong case for rationalizing the structure of the three major collection agencies. Concerning Gary's point, the paper does assume that the DCI has acquired an appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of the old CFI, now PRC(I) system. I think that is a reasonable assumption.

There is one point that is dealt with ambiguously, and which I know concerns you. In paragraph 14, Jim states that if the DCI were given "far-reaching" budgetary authority, demands would emerge for him to separate himself from CIA, and that this in turn would require that the DCI take the NIO's and the DDI with him. Thus, he would have line authority only over the production elements and budgetary authority (without line authority) over NRP, CCP and what's left of CIA. The argument that in return for a budgetary control that does not do much to strengthen the DCI, he would have to separate himself from CIA is not very convincing.

But more important, Jim doesn't deal at all with the argument that if the DCI had true line and tasking as well as budgetary authority over NRP and CCP, he would need to break DDI out of CIA and put it directly in his own office. This seemed to be the thrust of the position that some were arguing at our meeting last week.

It sounds fine in logic--but I don't think we should accept it as the ideal solution. After all, under such an arrangement, the Director of CIA would report directly to the DCI, and the latter could presumably make whatever special arrangements he needed to assure responsiveness of the DDI to his needs as advisor to the President, etc. There are powerful institutional and historical arguments for maintaining the integrity of the CIA structure. If the significance of these are appreciated, the DCI would want to retain the CIA organization, and fine tune it enough to assure that the DDI element would fill his needs if he is given authority over NRP and CCP.



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Executive Registry

77-556/34

6 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Comptroller

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Further Thoughts on PRM-11 Issues

1. During your session with us the other day on our paper on the options available under PRM 11, you asked several fundamental questions about the nature of the authorities we thought you needed to do your job. Following the meeting we spent some additional time talking with [] about his related efforts and got from him some further insight into your questions. As I understand it, you have divided the question of authorities into three basic areas: those dealing with the ability to task the Community to do your bidding, those which involve enhanced budgetary authority, and those which deal with line authority. [] suggested that a paper dealing with some of the issues inherent in these concepts might be helpful to you, and we offer the following.

2. We see the problem similarly but would argue that line authority and tasking are in fact one and the same thing. Tasking in our view is a subset of line authority and not an independent, stand-alone variable. But let us take you through our reasoning. To do that we will talk about the tasking question first, then line authority, and then budgetary authority.

3. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding the concept of tasking. Let us elaborate on two different views as to what tasking means. You are today under the 1947 Act charged with pulling together intelligence from all the various producers and collectors in the Intelligence Community and integrating it for the consideration of policy makers. You thus have the legal authority to ask for the product of all Community components and to ask collectors to collect certain kinds of information. In the case of CIA you cannot only ask that the information be collected but direct that that task

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